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ABSTRACT
The primary aim of biomedical research is to discover and develop 
new knowledge to advance human medicine. Frequently a ‘mouse 
model’ is taken to be a necessary step towards understanding a dis-
ease, biological mechanism or intervention. We argue for caution 
with respect to the mouse model: theoretical reasons, meta-analyses 
of empirical data, and viable alternatives all support a more restricted 
use of animals in laboratories than that which is presented in cur-
rent practice. On its own terms, a utilitarian scientific justification for 
using animals in biomedical research converges more closely with 
welfarist claims than is usually recognised.
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1. Introduction
It is often claimed that the use of animals in biomedical re-
search is justified by the beneficial consequences for human 
learning and welfare. This utilitarian argument for using ani-
mals in biomedical research has long been contested from both 
utilitarian and other ethical perspectives (for example, Singer 
1977; Regan 1983). For the argument in this paper, we accept 
that some use of animals can be justified on the basis of human 
welfare. Likewise, we simply accept that the primary aim of 
biomedical research is to discover and develop new knowledge 
to advance human well-being, via improvements in medicine. 
By updating the empirical claims about the purported benefits 
of mouse-model research, we show that the utilitarian ap-
proach most often used to defend scientific practices involv-
ing animals does not offer carte blanche to current practices of 
mouse-based biomedical research, especially where there are 
alternatives with better scientific justification. We show that 
converging moral and scientific reasons demand changes to the 
current priority given to the mouse model. We offer a science-
friendly way of assessing whether a mouse model is the right 
way to go, by exploring some of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the mouse model and alternatives to its use.
This convergence of a biomedical utilitarian approach with 
at least moderate animal welfarist claims is important, because 
discussion of how animals are used in scientific study too often 
divides into an animal welfare versus scientific autonomy and 
quality argument. This tends to be an unhelpful polarisation. 
Both sides deploy war-style language, for example, “weap-
onry” and “truce” (Nature editorial 2009; Abbott 2010). The 
philosophical and humanities literature concerning animals 
in scientific research often goes unheeded by the practitioners 
who ultimately decide what happens to animals in laboratories. 
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By showing the convergence of scientific reasons and animal 
welfare outcomes, we hope to contribute to a more constructive 
discussion.  
The paper begins with some brief background to the mouse 
model. The second part explains why such models are, in prin-
ciple, of limited utility. We start, not from an animal welfare 
position, but from increasingly prominent concerns about trans-
lation of pre-clinical animal research results to human benefit 
(Hackam and Redelmeier 2006; Pound et al. 2004; Contopou-
los-Ioannidis et al. 2003). Scientific literature already contains 
suggestions that instead of “systematic review” of the animal 
literature, what is needed are “critical reviews” to determine 
the best use, if any, of animal evidence before human clinical 
trials (Lemon and Dunnett 2005). We offer some theoretical 
resources that could inform such critical reviews.
The third section sketches one of the “animal-free” alterna-
tives that recent technology makes available, which we show 
to have scientific as well as ethical advantages. These consider-
ations show that justified animal use, based on utilitarian prin-
ciples and claims about human benefit, is restricted to certain 
specifiable contexts, given scientific concerns about inter-spe-
cies translation and newly available research alternatives. 
2. Animal research and solving human disease 
problems
With the advent of scientific medicine 400 years ago, early 
studies of animals helped reveal the foundations of anatomy 
and organ function. By the post second world war period, ani-
mal work yielded further insights into human disease, as sug-
gested by the Comroe and Dripps review of 1976 (although 
subsequently contested). In the field of immunology, for ex-
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ample, recognition of virus-infected cells via major histocom-
patibility complex-restriction and T-B lymphocyte cooperation 
in antibody production (Doherty and Zinkernagel 1975; Miller 
and Mitchell 1968) were important fundamental concepts de-
rived from mice that helped human health understanding, con-
tributing to vaccine development and immunotherapy. More 
recently, mouse studies have been lauded in the discovery of a 
successful SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) vaccine 
design (Yang et al. 2004), although a more recent review sug-
gests some obstacles before translation to an effective human 
vaccine (Roper and Rehm 2009). Arguably the past success of 
many animal studies or models has led to the assumption that 
animal experimentation results are generalisable to all human 
diseases, including those related to human psychology and 
brain dysfunction such as autism and depression (Bangash et 
al. 2011; Pryce and Seifritz 2011).
The numbers of animals in general, and mice in particular, 
used in biomedical research are increasing (Pound et al. 2004; 
Greek and Greek 2010). Likely explanations include technical 
advances in the genetic engineering of mice, and the cultural 
milieu of biomedical researchers, particularly pertaining to re-
ward and recognition systems (Degeling and Johnson 2009). 
Mice are cheap, easy to source and house, amenable to a wide 
variety of interventions, including genetic manipulation, and 
they are presumed to be a good, if not indispensable, source of 
initial data for biomedical solutions to human health problems. 
In the fundamental research setting, the paucity of validated and 
effective alternatives to replace animal experiments reinforces 
the widespread, and increasing, reliance on mouse models.
Yet not all animal studies deliver benefits: at the broader or-
ganism level, encouraging results from mouse studies on can-
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cer immunotherapy and autoimmunity were of limited utility 
for humans, and understanding of disease biology after micro-
bial infection has been “skewed” by factors of experimental 
design (Burrows and Khanna 2011).
The last decade or so has seen a number of literature analy-
ses that highlight significant concerns about the actual flow of 
fundamental research discoveries in mice and other animals to 
the translation to successful clinical trial outcomes, and thence 
to tangible health benefits for humans.  This is of both ethical 
and scientific concern, given that the aim of such animal stud-
ies is to solve medical challenges. For example, a statistical 
investigation of the biomedical literature by Hackam and Re-
delmeier (2006) focussed only on highly cited prestige journal 
publications with subsequent citation rates greater than 500 
(range, 639-2233 citations) that “ …investigated a preventive 
or therapeutic intervention in an in vivo animal model…”. The 
analysis identified the following features in the seventy-six 
(76) research publications that fulfilled the study criteria; all 
papers reported positive results, 49% were rated as of “good 
methodological quality”, 37% were later assessed in human 
randomised trials, 18% were refuted by the results of human 
randomised trial and 45% were not subjected to randomised 
trial evaluation. Finally, only eight of the animal studies rep-
licated in human randomised trials were approved for patient 
use. 
A translation rate of 8 from 76 high impact animal studies 
may be deemed acceptable, but the rate for animal studies as a 
whole is probably much lower. It can be assumed that animal 
studies published in lower tier journals are less likely to go to 
randomised trial at all and hence have a lower likelihood of 
leading to human benefit. The lower tier journal animal studies 
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may, however, have an indirect effect,  and perhaps they form 
the foundational literature for the prestige papers anlaysed by 
Hackam and Redelmeier (2006). This will need further investi-
gation, but on the face of the current evidence, the use of mice 
and other animal models does not regularly result in a final 
product or intervention of tangible medical benefit. A careful 
assessment of the practical conduct of animal-based biomedi-
cal research is needed to ascertain the legitimate or appropriate 
use of animals. Even if animal welfare issues are bracketed, 
a restricted utilitarian argument based only on pragmatic and 
resource based considerations would motivate such a re-assess-
ment. 
If results from mouse models do not translate as frequently 
as researchers hope, then perhaps other models are more prom-
ising. By considering some of the challenges involved in trans-
lating results from one group, population or species to another, 
some of the advantages (and different challenges) of alternative 
approaches can become evident. In the following section, we 
consider theoretical issues with inter-species translation. 
3. Internal and external validity
One reason why initially promising results in mouse models 
fail to translate to medical benefits for humans is that the mouse 
research is internally, but not externally valid. (Those studies 
that lack “good methodological quality” would not even be in-
ternally valid.)  Translation, or extrapolating from a model pop-
ulation (for example, laboratory mice) to a target population (in 
this case humans) is complex. When a successful translation 
is made from a mouse model to the human case, it is because 
the studies are externally, not just internally valid. Cartwright 
explains the difference between external and internal validity:
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A study that is internally valid is one that confers a high 
probability of truth on the result of the study.... Exter-
nal validity has to do with whether the result that is es-
tablished in the study will be true elsewhere (2010, 60).
Mouse models are good at establishing internal validity—for 
the experimental population, or in the lab, the data are robust. 
However, they are not necessarily good for external reliability. 
The successful rate of translation to the contexts that ‘really 
matter’—treating human patients in complex clinical environ-
ments—is problematically low. Reasons for this include dif-
ferent metabolic processes between species, however closely 
they might be related (this problem is captured by the “mod-
eller’s functional fallacy”, and in terms of species distance, the 
“modeller’s phylogenetic fallacy”—see LaFollette and Shanks 
1995, 150). Even when a genetic modification allows the ‘right’ 
process to be studied, precisely the condition of isolating it can 
mean that the model process differs from the process in its 
‘natural’ conditions, where confounding and interacting factors 
abound.
Mouse models are often thought to deliver “proof of con-
cept” but this phrase is more ambiguous than its familiarity 
would suggest. If a mouse model allows proof of concept, is 
that with respect to internal validity, that is, with respect to the 
model population, or does it achieve external validity? Much 
of the discussion of mouse model use seems tacitly to accept 
that extrapolation can be assumed. It takes external validity for 
granted, assuming that the concept proved is a concept that ap-
plies to the target (human) population. (In the context of medi-
cal advances, researchers and the public are not very interested 
in mice for their own sake). But the counter examples, and the 
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various explanations for failures of translation prompt a more 
cautious response. 
A mouse model alone can only be internally valid. In or-
der to warrant an extrapolation proof of concept, the mecha-
nism needs to be demonstrated on both sides of the analogy or 
translation—the target and the model. It is sometimes argued 
that the work needed to achieve this level of certainty makes 
the mouse model redundant. If I know enough to extrapolate 
from the model to the target, I know the mechanism works in 
the target population—and I can’t get that information from 
even the most extensive investigation of a heterogeneous dif-
ferent model population. It must come from direct examination 
of the target population. Steel (2008) labels this the extrapola-
tion circle. He argues, however, that the trap is merely appar-
ent. Comparative process tracing can allow us to compare the 
model and the target at critical points of the mechanism, so the 
total picture of the mechanism in the target, which would make 
the model redundant, is not necessary after all.  
By comparative process tracing, Steel means that within a 
complex process, there will be salient stages that can be com-
pared. So a researcher doesn’t have to know all about the 
mechanism in the target population, just about parts of the pro-
cess, especially those parts where convergence or divergence is 
likely. Some of this can be studied in vitro, some evidence will 
be available from other studies, and so on. Piece by piece, an 
understanding of the whole mechanism or process can be built 
up—there doesn’t need to be a perfect analogy of the whole 
thing in the mouse model, nor is a thorough grasp of the process 
in the target population needed to confirm that analogy. 
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4. Causal and hypothetical analogical models
Another perspective on animal-based biomedical research is 
offered by La Follette and Shanks (1995), who offer a qualified 
endorsement of animal models. They distinguish causal ana-
logical models (CAMs) from hypothetical analogical models 
(HAMs). A CAM is characterised as identifying “the causal 
mechanisms which produce and direct the course of a disease 
or condition in animals” (142). These results can then be ex-
tended by analogy to the disease or condition in humans. On 
the assumptions of the CAM, identifying a biological mecha-
nism in a mouse can inform us about the mechanism that oper-
ates in humans: a very strong claim. Alternatively, the HAM 
takes animal models to “prompt the formation of hypotheses 
about the nature of biomedical phenomena in humans” (141). A 
HAM identifies a possible mechanism, the question of whether 
it is instantiated in the human case remains open. They con-
cluded that only CAMs offer evidence for extrapolation. 
However, as Steel (2008) points out, the HAM/CAM distinc-
tion relies on the difference between contexts of discovery and 
justification. “HAMs are animal models in the in the context of 
discovery, while CAMs are models in the context of justifica-
tion” (Steel 2008, 96). A strict division between discovery and 
justification is, however, unsustainable—the two ‘activities’ are 
mutually relevant, and rely on the same kind of (and sometimes 
precisely the same) evidence. Steel proposes that these types of 
models occupy a continuum, in which there is greater or weak-
er evidence for extrapolation. He further argues that the kind of 
evidence required to support extrapolation depends on the kind 
of claim in question.
This suggests that any use of a mouse model should be care-
fully considered, with respect to the likelihood of extrapola-
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tion. Researchers, and funding bodies, need to ask whether evi-
dence for (or against) extrapolation from the mouse model to 
the human case exists for the project itself, or in related areas. 
Is there a pattern of successful and unsuccessful translations in 
the neighbourhood? For pragmatic as well as ethical reasons, 
scientific endeavour should not rely on a mouse model, without 
good reason to do so. LaFollette and Shanks suggest that a hy-
pothetical role possibly remains in “basic” research questions 
where similarities in organ or tissue function exist between spe-
cies, but the role of mice and other animal models in “goal-
oriented” research, like medical research, is questionable and 
hence a potential mouse trap for researchers and funders. While 
the animal model can be of value to biomedical advances, we 
must consider alternatives to animal models  (e.g., computer 
simulations) as important tools with which to make discoveries 
for medical benefit.
5. An animal replacement alternative
While LaFollette and Shanks recognise the importance of 
animal models, they also point out that animal models might 
not always be the best approach:
“Of course, if animal models can serve as HAMs to 
spur research, perhaps clinical investigations, cell cul-
tures, computer simulations, or epidemiological stud-
ies might be effective HAMs as well. At the very least, 
these other methods need no longer be construed as 
poor cousins to animal research. They may all become 
a more important part of basic biomedical research” 
(1995, 159).
Mouse models have distinct advantages. Beyond the ease of 
housing and breeding mice in controlled laboratory environ-
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ments are the genetic issues, namely, the ability to compare 
mouse strains of uniform genetic background to limit biologi-
cal variation in the experimental system. This cannot be done 
for human populations (i.e., the target population for medical 
research). But it may not be always necessary, nor advanta-
geous to eliminate variation.
Consider the difference between efficacy and effectiveness 
(Cartwright 2010). When a double-blind randomised control 
trial shows that an intervention makes a difference to the ex-
perimental population, what is needed to justify an expectation 
that it will be effective in the clinical population? For the infer-
ence from efficacy to effectiveness to be justified, the popu-
lations need to be similar, the intervention and its penumbra 
of features need to be constant, and the kinds of potentially 
confounding issues that are excluded from the trial, such as co-
morbidities and practical difficulties with compliance, need to 
be taken into account in the ‘real life’ condition. Ethical con-
cerns about failure to benefit, and even harm patients, and also 
about the deployment of scarce healthcare resources in sub-op-
timal ways, are raised when efficacy fails to translate to effec-
tiveness. An alternative to mouse models, which new technolo-
gies now make available, is to develop computational models 
from extensive human pathology data. On this approach, the 
model and the target population are just the same – the com-
monly encountered gap between efficacy and effectiveness will 
not arise. 
Modern health systems contain abundant human medical 
and epidemiological data that can lend itself to computer simu-
lation and modelling. For example, taking advantage of volu-
minous human pathology data sets, Lidbury and Richardson 
(2012) have proposed a new system as a HAM alternative to 
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mouse models. This system takes advantage of computational 
machine-learning methods that act as powerful classification 
data mining and pattern recognition tools. The approach, un-
like the standard mouse model which uses genetically uniform 
mouse strains, uses genetic and other variability to its advan-
tage. Rather than breeding from scratch (and/or genetically 
engineering murine embryos to express or delete a gene of in-
terest), the pattern recognition HAM takes the diverse human 
population, as represented by the data set, and identifies prop-
erties associated with a sub-population as defined by a disease 
response (in this example, infection by Hepatitis B virus). By 
working with pathology laboratory data, this system also has 
the advantage of access to routine prospective samples for bio-
logical validation testing of computational model predictions 
and once classification has been achieved and validated, will 
link with genetic databases and technologies (e.g. using high 
throughput sequencing). In line with the proposal that “these 
other methods need no longer be construed as poor cousins to 
animal research” (LaFollette and Shanks 1995, 159), this sys-
tem has the potential to be as effective a HAM as any mouse 
model, but given the removal of the species barrier, its results 
may have enhanced validity and hence yield better effective-
ness since it avoids the gap between internal and external valid-
ity—the model and target populations are the same.  
6. Conclusion
Both theoretical considerations, and empirical evidence from 
meta-analyses of animal research prompt caution about inter-
species translation. Together these reasons constitute a power-
ful argument for reduced reliance on the mouse model. This 
argument aligns with, although it does not depend on, welfarist 
concerns about research involving animals. There are already 
clear alternatives to the mouse system, such as the data-mining 
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approach described above, and advances in technology and 
analytic tools will make others available. Consideration of the 
advantages and limitations of mouse models allow scientists 
and funders to discern the most effective approach to particular 
biomedical research questions, and to avoid “mousetraps”. As 
researchers continue to seek and develop models for the causes 
of human disease and the development of therapeutic interven-
tions, the burden is on biomedical scientists to consider and 
invest in non-animal methods as viable alternatives.
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